

The Society of Descendants of Militia Officers

Paper Number 1

## **Manning of Militia Companies of Foot in the War of the Regulation 1771**

By

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### **I. INTRODUCTION**

The War of the Regulation in North Carolina was a period of developing unrest that extended from attacks on officials in 1768 to full scale unrest bordering on active insurrection in 1771. A variety of causes drove this rebellion, ranging from perceptions of corruption and exploitation of the common man by officials, to resentment of any central authority and economic unfairness. Eventually, in 1771, the grievances transitioned into what was perceived as an armed threat by a growing plebian army to Royal authority. To quell the unrest the Royal Governor, William Tryon, mobilized the Provincial Militia and marched in two columns, one commanded by General Hugh Waddell, moving from Salisbury to the east, and the other by himself, from New Bern to the west. Although Waddell's progress was blocked at the Yadkin River by an overwhelming number of Regulators, Governor Tryon's force met and summarily defeated a major body of the Regulators on the farm of Captain Michael Holt near Alamance in Orange County, essentially ending the War. The surviving records provide a clear record of a well thought out and well managed military expedition in which the Militia was successful on the battlefield (*Colonial and State Record*, Vol. 8, 574-607, Vol. 19, 837-854, Powell 1965)

Research Questions: This study addresses two research questions:

Question 1. What was the standard objective company in the North Carolina Provincial Militia of 1771?

Question 2. How closely did the companies of foot of the Provincial Army in the field against the Regulators in 1771 approach the objective company standard.

Potential Value of the Research: This study will increase our understanding of the manning of the North Carolina Militia during the War of the Regulation. Data on manning of companies may also help in understanding the manning of militia companies on active service in the subsequent Revolutionary War.

Unique Terms:

**Combat Leaders:** Commissioned (Captain, Lieutenant, and Ensign) and Non-Commissioned (Sergeant and Corporal) Officers who provided the leadership core for the Company in combat.

**Detachment:** Although the organizational status of the term detachment is not described in the *Colonial and State Records of North Carolina*, this term is commonly used later in the context of militia detached from their normal county regiment for duty as part of a military force when the entire regiment was not called into service. This usage is present in both the Revolutionary War and is formalized as the process by which states were tasked for militia forces for operations outside their state in the War of 1812 (see North Carolina 1851 and “Vermont State Militia” 1823).

**Men:** When used in the context of number of men provided by a county, evidence suggests that commissioned officers (Captains and subalterns) are not counted in the total as men. More research is required to determine whether, at this point in time, sergeants, drummers, and clerks were counted as men.

**Objective Company:** Throughout this research the term objective company refers to a company in the field with the desired number of officers (Captain, Lieutenant, and Ensign in foot companies or Cornet in troops of horse), non-commissioned officers (Sergeant and Corporal), and Privates considered ideal for combat operations.

**Return:** A return is a tabular report of the number of personnel assigned to a military force at a given date. It does not identify individuals, but, in the case of the returns used in this study, does identify organization of assignment and rank.

**Soldiers:** The term soldiers in tables is used cumulatively for commissioned officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates.

**Subaltern:** The term subaltern encompasses company grade officers below the rank of Captain, thus Lieutenants, Ensigns, and Cornets. The term is associated with the British Army and is contemporary to the period.

## **II. LITERATURE**

The Militia of Pennsylvania and New England prior to and during the American Revolution have received some attention in detailed and thorough studies. These include examinations of the evolution of the organization of the Massachusetts Militia (Wright 1986), the development of the Philadelphia Associators (Seymour 2012), the first year of operations of the Pennsylvania Militia (Roach 1964), and the Militia’s response in the Lexington (Hambrick-Stowe and Smerlas 1976) and Danbury Alarms (Darley 2015). However, similar analytical attention has not been devoted to the Militia

of the southern colonies (although authors, including Lewis 2015, Moss 1992 and 1985, Bockstruck 1988, and Crozier 1905, have collected impressive amounts of data that would support analytical study). The War of the Regulation offers an opportunity to draw conclusions about the southern Militia from a relatively thorough coverage of that relatively small conflict.

The War of the Regulation has been examined by a number of historians in social and political terms. For example, a fair amount of attention has been devoted to the claim, widely understood in North Carolina as true, that the Battle of Alamance was the first battle of the Revolutionary War (a claim disputed by Virginians in favor of the Battle of Point Pleasant in 1774 during Lord Dunmore's War). The actual military forces under the command of Governor Tryon and their battlefield performance have received only minor attention, and the best source for the actual order of battle and deployment on the field remains the maps in Powell's 1965 study of the Battle of Alamance.

The primary and most accessible source for examination of the North Carolina Provincial Militia in the War of the Regulation is the large volume of materials contained in the *Colonial and State Records of North Carolina*. This online collection of transcribed documents curated by the University of North Carolina Library contains returns, order books, and a journal of the campaign that allows a reasonably accurate reconstruction of the Militia objective company and the comparison of this ideal to the actual strength of the units in the field.

### **III. METHOD**

Available data was extracted from the returns in the *Colonial and State Records of North Carolina* and consolidated into tables for analysis. The first stage of work addressed the first research question, using Governor Tryon's initial tasking for mobilization of the Provincial Militia army to define the size and composition of an objective company. The obvious separation of tasking by county into standard multiples of men provided the basis for the number of Privates to be assigned to a company. Subsequent searches of the record identified correspondence to selected regimental colonels that provided the officer and non-commissioned officer staffing of the company.

The second stage of the research was directed toward meeting the second research question. This required identifying the actual manning of the companies that marched under the command of Governor Tryon and General Waddell. Two returns identified almost all of the known units and provided detailed staffing by rank for each county detachment. This allowed identification of the composition of the Provincial forces, although the group nature of returns by county necessitated the assumption that 1 Captain, 1 Lieutenant, and 1 Ensign in a return was a marker of a Company and that multiples of this marker indicated multiple companies. Basic descriptive statistics were applied to identify mean (average), median, and range values for the companies, and ratios were established to identify the distribution of combat leaders to soldiers.

In detachments with evidence of multiple companies, I assumed for the purposes of analysis that the total number of men would be equally divided between the companies so that each company would have equal strength. This is a significant assumption, because the evidence of Militia companies responding to alarms in the Revolutionary War clearly indicates that company manning varied widely (see Hambrick-Stowe and Smerlas 1976 on the Lexington Alarm and Darley 2015 on the Danbury Alarm). However, these were short notice responses in which there was no established central command structure. In the case of the campaign leading to the Battle of Alamance, county detachments were together for as long as 24 days in assembling and marching as a column prior to the Battle. Included in this time line was a formal review in order of battle at Smith's Ferry. In addition, Wake County drafted its company from a general muster of the entire Militia of the county, and Orange County recruited volunteers and drafted sufficient to dispatch two companies, followed by two more which finally filled their number at the rendezvous in Hillsborough (Colonial and State Records, Vol. 19, 837-854). This suggests that maintaining companies based on village affiliation, common in the northern colonies, may have been less of a consideration in the south. If so, time existed to make manning adjustments to achieve balanced strength. Having companies of a standard strength, clearly envisioned by Governor Tryon, would have provided standard fire units on the battlefield, and simplified logistical arrangements on the march.

Values developed for each company were then compared to other companies and to the values of the objective company to determine the degree to which units conformed to that standard. A key tool for this analysis was the development of ratios of combat leaders to Privates. A higher ratio of combat leaders would tend to indicate better management of the unit on the battlefield and enhanced unit cohesion under the stress of combat. At the same time, more officers with spontoons and non-commissioned officers with halberds would have reduced the volume of fire a company of full-time soldiers could direct at opponents. This may have been less of a consideration in Militia units with officers who carried muskets or rifles much like their men.

#### **IV. THE DATA**

Governor Tryon clearly had in mind an objective company force structure when he first alerted the Militia to be prepared to form a Provincial Army to oppose the Regulators. On 19 March 1771 Governor William Tryon wrote to the Colonels of the 29 County Regiments tasking them to raise volunteers to march against the Regulators. These tasking ranged from 300 men from the Mecklenburgh County Regiment to 50 men from Curretuck County (see Table 1). In each case the Regiment was tasked in a multiple of 50 men (Colonial and State Records, Vol. 8, 697), the median and modal request (n=19).

In an earlier letter to the Colonels of the Dobbs, Johnston, and Wake County Regiments on 7 February 1771 (Colonial and State Records, Vol. 8, page 687) in response to a threat by the Regulators against the provincial capital, Governor Tryon had established the

leadership structure for these 50 man contingents. The proportion of officers and non-commissioned officers per 50 were to be 3 commissioned officers (1 Captain, 1 Lieutenant, and 1 Ensign), 4 non-commissioned officers (2 Sergeants and 2 Corporals, and 1 drummer.

**Table 1. Governor Tryon’s Tasking to the County Regiments**

County Regiment ( <i>asterisk see note 1</i> )	Number of Men	Estimated Number of Objective Companies ( <i>note 2</i> )	Revolutionary War Militia District ( <i>note 3</i> )
Anson*	50	1	Salisbury
Mecklenburgh*	300	6	Salisbury
Rowan*	200	4	Salisbury
Tryon*	50	1	Salisbury
Granville	100	2	Hillsborough
Orange*	200	4	Hillsborough
Wake*	50	1	Hillsborough
Bute	50	1	Halifax
Edgecomb	50	1	Halifax
Halifax	50	1	Halifax
Northampton	50	1	Halifax
Bertie	50	1	Edenton
Chowan	50	1	Edenton
Curretuck	50	1	Edenton
Hertford	50	1	Edenton
Perquimans	50	1	Edenton
Tyrell	50	1	Edenton
Beaufort*	50	1	New Bern
Carteret*	100	2	New Bern
Craven*	200	4	New Bern
Dobbs*	200	4	New Bern
Hyde	50	1	New Bern
Johnston*	100	2	New Bern
Pitt	100	2	New Bern
Bladen	50	1	Wilmington
Cumberland*	50	1	Wilmington
Duplin	50	1	Wilmington
New Hanover*	100	2	Wilmington
Onslow*	50	1	Wilmington
Total	2250 soldiers	49 companies	

**Source:** “List of troops to be raised for the North Carolina militia in the campaign against the Regulators,” 19 March 1771, in *Colonial and State Records of North Carolina*, Volume 08, page 697.

**Notes:** (1) Counties noted with an asterisk supplied troops for the Provincial Army, including both Governor Tryon's and General Waddell's columns.

(2) The estimated number of objective companies is based on the assumption that a 50 man increment represents one company.

(3) North Carolina Militia was organized in the Revolutionary War into brigades based on geographically based judicial districts (Lewis 2015). I have used these as a convenient way to group the county regiments from west to east to reflect their relative location within the state. There is no evidence that the district structure was in use by the Militia in 1771, and regiment is the highest organizational level that appears in the *Colonial and State Records of North Carolina*.

In the aftermath of the Battle of Alamance, a return of Governor Tryon's force on 22 May 1771 showed a total combatant strength of 1184 officers and men (not including chaplains, surgeons, surgeons mates, servants, waggoners, and women) (see Table 2).

**Table 2. Manning of Governor Tryon's Army (note 1)**

	Craven Regiment Detachment	Carteret Regiment Detachment	New Hanover Regiment Detachment	Onslow Regiment Detachment	Johnston Regiment Detachment
Colonels	1	1	1	1	1
Lieutenant Colonels	1	0	0	0	0
Majors	0	0	0	0	0
Captains	3	1	2	1	2
Lieutenants	3	1	2	1	2
Ensigns	3	1	2	1	2
Adjutants	1	1	1	1	1
Quartermasters	1	0	0	0	0
Clerks	3	1	2	1	2
Sergeants	6	2	4	2	4
Musick	0	0	1	0	0
Drummers	3	1	2	1	1
Privates	144	53	81	42	54
Total	169 soldiers	62 soldiers	98 soldiers	51 soldiers	69 soldiers
Estimated Companies (note 2)	3 companies	1 company	2 companies	1 companies	2 companies

	Orange Regiment Detachment	Beaufort Regiment Detachment	Dobbs Regiment Detachment	Artillery (note 3)
Colonels	1	1	1	1
Lieutenant Colonels	1	0	0	0
Majors	1	0	1	0
Captains	4	1	4	2
Lieutenants	4	1	4	3
Ensigns	4	1	4	1
Adjutants	2	1	1	1
Quartermasters	0	0	1	0
Clerks	4	0	4	2
Sergeants	8	2	8	6
Musick	0	0	1	0
Drummers	3	1	2	2
Privates	162	35	160	110
Total	194 soldiers	43 soldiers	191 soldiers	128 soldiers
Estimated Companies (note 2)	4 companies (note 5)	1 company	4 companies	organized as a corps of artillery

	Light Horse Troop	Company of Rangers	Wake Regiment Detachment	Corps of Light Infantry (note 4)
Colonels	0	0	1	0
Lieutenant Colonels	0	0	0	0
Majors	0	0	0	0
Captains	1	1	1	1
Lieutenants	0	1	1	1
Ensigns	0	1	1	1
Adjutants	0	0	0	1
Quartermasters	0	0	0	0
Clerks	0	1	1	1
Sergeants	0	2	2	2
Musick	0	0	0	1
Drummers	0	1	1	0
Privates	22	54	46	54
Total	23 soldiers	61 soldiers	54 soldiers	62 soldiers
Estimated Companies (note 2)	1 company	1 company	1 company	1 company

**Source:** “Militia Return of the troops at Sandy Creek,” 22 May 1771, in *Colonial and State Records of North Carolina*, Volume 08, page 677.

**Notes:** (1) The return does not include a Company of Pioneers, 1 ensign, 1 sergeant, and 8 privates, which is known to have been established from personnel from the Surry County regiment (Green 2015).

(2) The number of companies is based on the number of Captains and subalterns with 1 Captain, 1 Lieutenant, and 1 Ensign probably indicating a Company.

(3) The manning for the artillery came from a New Hanover County Regiment Artillery Company, supplemented possibly from the Craven and Carteret County Regiments (Green 2015).

(4) The Corps of Light Infantry was formed by designating the Cumberland County Regiment’s detachment as Light Infantry to operate separately from the line (Green 2015).

(5) The Orange County Regiment detachment is known to have had four companies.

General Hugh Waddell’s Order Book (*Colonial and State Records*, Vol. 8, 607) provides one return of the troops forming a composite regiment under his command on 6 May 1771. This force of 284 officers and men composed his column marching to the west that was halted by the presence of large numbers of Regulators after crossing the Yadkin River (Powell 1965).

**Table 3. Manning of General Waddell’s Regiment**

	Artillery Company	Anson Regiment Detachment	Rowan Regiment Detachment	Mecklenburg Regiment Detachment	Tryon Regiment Detachment
Colonels	1	1		1	1
Captains	1	1	2	2	1
Lieutenants	2	1	2	2	1
Ensigns	0	1	2	2	1
Clerks	1	1	2	2	1
Sergeants	0	2	4	4	2
Drummers	1	0	1	2	1
Privates	34	16	76	70	40
Total	40 soldiers	23 soldiers	89 soldiers	84 soldiers	48 soldiers
Estimated Companies (note 1)	1 company	1 company	2 companies	2 companies	1 company

**Source:** “Order Book for Hugh Waddell’s regiment in the military campaign against the Regulators,” 6 May 1771, in *Colonial and State Records of North Carolina*, Volume 08, page 607.



**Notes:** (1) The number of companies is based on the number of Captains and subalterns with 1 Captain, 1 Lieutenant, and 1 Ensign probably indicating a Company.

When only the companies of foot are examined, the existing data suggests that the characteristics of the line companies during the War of the Regulation by county is as shown in Table 4. This assumes for the purpose of the analysis that manpower in the detachments was evenly distributed between companies when more than one company was most likely present.

**Table 4. Characteristics of Line Companies in the North Carolina Provincial Army of 1771**

County	Captain	Lieutenant	Ensign	Adjutant	Sergeants	Privates
Anson	1	1	1	0	2	16
Beaufort	1	1	1	1	2	35
Carteret	1	1	1	1	2	53
Craven	1	1	1	0.33	2	48
Cumberland (Light Infantry) (note 1)	1	1	1	1	2	54
Dobbs	1	1	1	0.25	2	40
Johnston	1	1	1	0.5	2	27
New Hanover	1	1	1	0.5	2	40.5
Mecklenburg	1	1	1	0	2	35
Onslow	1	1	1	1	2	42
Orange	1	1	1	0.5	2	40.5
Rangers (note 2)	1	1	1	0	2	54
Rowan	1	1	1	0	2	38
Tryon	1	1	1	0	2	40
Wake	1	1	1	0	2	46

**Notes:** (1) I have included the Corps of Light Infantry as this designation was made after the actual Battle of Alamance on 16 May, and subsequent to the Cumberland detachment joining the Army on 20 May. Up until that point in time, they would have been considered a company of foot.

(2) Ranger units through the Revolutionary War were raised for frontier defense with an emphasis on scouting and small unit actions, not standing in the line of battle of an army. However, at both the 3 May 1771 review at Smith's Ferry and the Battle of Alamance the Ranger Company was split into the equivalent of two platoons and stationed on the far left and right flanks of the Provincial line (Powell 1965).

The position of Adjutant in this organization is somewhat obscure. Adjutant was an officer position, charged with the administrative duties of the unit to which he was assigned. If this is a company position, not every Company had an Adjutant assigned.

When the county detachments are examined, of the five foot and one artillery detachments assigned to General Waddell's column, all from the far west of the province, four had Colonels listed, but none had an adjutant listed on the return.

In contrast, from the rest of the state, of the ten county regiment detachments listed that were led by a Colonel, every one had an Adjutant, and only one did not (with the exception of the four company Orange County detachment, the largest of any of the county units). Only one company not led by a Colonel in the entire Provincial Army, the Cumberland County Regiment company detailed as the Corps of Light Infantry, had an Adjutant. This suggests that Adjutant was not a company level duty, but was part of the county regimental staff, and should be excluded from the analysis of the company data.

The returns provide additional important information on the ratio of combat leaders (commissioned and non-commissioned officers) to soldiers in the companies participating in the campaign. The specifics of where each leader stood when a company formed in line for battle depended on the drill manual in use. However, typically the Captain and Lieutenant were placed on the ends of the front rank, with Sergeants covering them in the same place in the second rank, and the Ensign located behind the formation (see, for example, *New Manual Exercise* 1758, Windham and Townshend 1759, Von Steuben 1807). Not only did this provide the control needed for disciplined volley fire, but it allowed leaders to maintain the alignment of ranks in formation that was a key to linear tactics. And in a day when battles were conducted at short distances (based on surviving descriptions the opening volley at Alamance was probably fired at under 100 yards, see Powell 1965 and Colonial and State Records, Vol. 19, 843-844), the combat leaders encouraged all important cohesion under fire.

When we examine the ratio of combat leaders to Privates for the companies in the Provincial Army, it is possible to develop leader to soldiers ratios for each company (again assuming that in multiple company detachments the soldiers were divided to create approximately equally sized companies). The results are shown in Table 5, ranked from smallest to largest ratio, and with the objective company included.

Of the 17 companies, the mean (average) company had 30.26 Privates and a ratio of 1:8.05. The median (middle company in the list from lowest to highest) company had 40.5 Privates and a ratio of 1:8.1. The range is from 16 Privates to 54 Privates and from one combat leader for each 3.2 Privates to one for 10.8 Privates. Obviously, one cannot have part of a Private as an operational individual on the battlefield, either in measuring the number of men or in a ratio. However, the numbers provide a basis for comparison in drawing conclusions.

When compared to the original tasking Governor Tryon issued (see Table 1), it is worth noting that:

(1) Thirteen out of twenty-nine counties contributed no companies to the campaign against the Regulators.

**Table 5. Combat Leader to Soldier Ratios in Militia Foot Companies**

Column	Detachment	Company	Leaders	Privates	Ratio
Waddell	Anson	One	5	16	1:3.2
Tryon	Johnston	One	5	27	1:5.4
		Two	5	27	1:5.4
Tryon	Beaufort	One	5	35	1:7
Waddell	Mecklenburgh	One	5	35	1:7
		Two	5	35	1:7
Tryon's instructions	Provincial Militia	Objective Company	7	50	1:7.1
Waddell	Rowan	One	5	38	1:7.6
		Two	5	38	1:7.6
Waddell	Tryon	One	5	40	1:8
Tryon	Dobbs	One	5	40	1:8
		Two	5	40	1:8
		Three	5	40	1:8
		Four	5	40	1:8
Tryon	New Hanover	One	5	40.5	1:8.1
		Two	5	40.5	1:8.1
Tryon	Orange	One	5	40.5	1:8.1
		Two	5	40.5	1:8.1
		Three	5	40.5	1:8.1
		Four	5	40.5	1:8.1
Tryon	Onslow	One	5	42	1:8.4
Tryon	Wake	One	5	46	1:9.2
Tryon	Craven	One	5	48	1:9.6
		Two	5	48	1:9.6
		Three	5	48	1:9.6
Tryon	Carteret	One	5	53	1:10.6
Tryon	Cumberland	One	5	54	1:10.8
Tryon	Rangers	One	5	54	1:10.8

(2) Of the eight counties that were tasked to send multiple companies and actually did send companies, five sent the tasked number:

- Craven, tasked for 4 companies, sent 3 Companies of Foot and 1 Company of Rangers
- Dobbs, tasked for 4 companies, sent 4 Companies of Foot
- Johnston, tasked for 2 companies, sent 2 Companies of Foot
- New Hanover, tasked for 2 companies, sent 2 Companies of Foot and 1 Company of Artillery
- Orange, tasked for 4 companies, sent 4 Companies of Foot

Three counties sent less than the requested number of companies:

- Carteret, tasked for 2 companies, sent 1 Company of Foot
- Mecklenburgh, tasked for 6 companies, sent 2 Companies of Foot
- Rowan, tasked for 4 companies, sent 2 Companies of Foot

(3) One county not tasked (Surry County, a new county formed in 1771 from part of Rowan County) provided a Company of 1 Ensign, 1 Sergeant, and 8 Privates, designated as a Company of Pioneers for Governor Tryon's Column (Green 2015).

(4) Two counties (Duplin and Granville) did not send their assigned companies. However, the Troop of Light Horse appears to have been formed from Gentlemen volunteers from these two counties (Green 2015).

Overall, the Governor requested 49 Militia Companies be raised. Ultimately 24 Companies of Foot, 1 Company of Rangers, 1 Corps of Light Infantry (1 company in strength), 1 Troop of Light Horse, 1 Corps of Artillery (approximately 2 companies in strength), and 1 Company of Pioneers took the field. This represented approximately 61.2% of the desired companies to suppress the Regulators. In terms of manpower, Governor Tryon requested counties to provide 2250 soldiers; approximately 1438 (63.9%) responded (this figure represents the total of the two available returns, plus the Company of Pioneers and minus 40 artillerymen who most probably appear on both returns).

## **V. CONCLUSIONS**

This study reaches two conclusions in answer to the research questions:

Question 1. What was the standard objective company in the North Carolina Provincial Militia of 1771?

The standard leadership cadre of the 7 February letter is consistent with the common allocation of officers and non-commissioned officers to a Company in other Colonies (see Hambrick-Stowe and Smerlas 1976 and Darley 2015). In combination with the 50 man multiples of Privates, this strongly suggests that Governor Tryon's objective company consisted of 3 commissioned officers (Captain, Lieutenant, and Ensign), 4 non-commissioned officers (2 Sergeants and 2 Corporals), 1 drummer, and 50 Privates.

Question 2: How closely did the foot companies of the Provincial Army in the field against the Regulators in 1771 approach the objective company standard?

The companies examined in this study came reasonably close to meeting the objective standard. Every company (accepting the possibility that there may have been detachment of an officer from a company for other duties or that two of one rank

reported for service) exactly matched the officer manning of 1 Captain, 1 Lieutenant, and 1 Ensign.

There is a shortfall in the non-commissioned officer manning, with 2 sergeants being listed for every company in the returns, as required by the objective standard. However, no corporals were listed in the returns. Given that every unit has the standard 2 Sergeants (again allowing for some variability when dealing with aggregate data on the returns), and that Governor Tryon had allowed for 2 Corporals in his instructions, some strategy must have been adopted to address the role of these non-commissioned officers in maintain unit integrity and formation on the battlefield. The sources consulted provide no hint of what that might have been. However, it should be noted that an alternative explanation is simply that Corporals were not considered of sufficient status to justify listing separately from the rank and file Privates. And it cannot be excluded that this may be simple administrative error, something as simple as the standard report format not including them.

The greatest variability lies in the number of Privates in the returns. Of the 14 county detachments one had under 20 Privates per company and three had over 50 privates per company. When all 27 foot companies are considered, they totaled 885 Privates, for a mean of 30.26 Privates per company, a range of 16 to 54, and a median of 40.5 Privates.

If we arbitrarily assume that 48 or more Privates is reasonably close enough to meeting the objective company standard of 50, only 6 companies (22.2%) meet the standard: 3 companies of foot from Craven County and 1 from Carteret County, the Corps of Light Infantry from Cumberland County, and the Ranger Company from Craven County. An additional 13 companies (48.1%) had 40 or more Privates. This means that sizeable portion of the force was understrength or significantly understrength (8 companies, 29.6%) when measured against the standard.

With 3 commissioned officers and 4 non-commissioned officers the objective company would have provided 7 combat leaders for 50 Privates, a 1:7.1 ratio. The smallest company in the study (again understanding the averaged nature of the data) provided a ratio of 1:3.2 (Anson County, 5 leaders to 16 Privates) . For that company to achieve any shock value by its volley fire, everyone would have had to engaged in combat primarily with a musket or rifle. The largest companies (the Corps of Light Infantry and the Rangers, 5 leaders to 54 Privates) would have provided a ratio of 1:10.8.

If Corporals had been included in the returns (or if companies had Corporals in their ranks), the ratios would have been much closer to the objective company for the six companies from Craven and Carteret Counties, the Rangers, and the Corps of Light Infantry (Cumberland County). However, given their absence, the five companies from Beaufort, Mecklenburgh, and Rowan Counties are closest in combat leader to Private ratios to the objective company.

### Other Conclusions:

Although not the focus of this study, it is obvious from the returns, as well as order books and a campaign journal, that both Governor Tryon's and General Waddell's columns were managed as composite regiments. No single county regiment was called out for active service as a regiment. And the limited number of Lieutenant Colonels (n=2) and Majors (n=2) from the returns shows a staffing pattern that is analogous to Revolutionary War and later staffing for Militia Regiments, typically a Colonel in command, a Lieutenant Colonel, and a Major.

In contrast, the presence of a large number of Colonels (n=14 compared to a total force of 1438 of all ranks), may reflect their duty to raise and provide companies, a desire to actually lead the men from their county (given that county regimental Colonels were often locally prominent, socially, politically, and economically), or as a political statement of support for the Governor against the Regulators. When the Wake County Regiment mustered approximately 400 men for a 1:400 ratio of colonels to men (*Colonial and State Records*, Vol. 19, 838), the overall Provincial force achieved an approximately 1:103 ratio with most county detachments, even if only of company size) being led by a Colonel.

Some (notably Hambrick-Stowe and Smerlas 1976) have argued that Militia typically operated with an excessive manning of combat leaders. I am not sure that is a sustainable argument. In 2007, the combat leader to men ratio in a United States Army infantry platoon was 12 leaders (1 officer and 11 non-commissioned officers) to 27 men with no specific leadership role, a ratio of 1:2.25 (United States 2007). In another type of combat, recommendations for standard fire department staffing of engine companies (the basic unit committed to combat fires) are 1 company officer and 3 firefighters, a ratio of 1:3 (Kirby and Lakamp 2012). For wildland firefighting, and in general all types of emergency response, the National Incident Management System standard span of control is one supervisor to 3 to 7 workers, with a 1:5 ratio being considered the ideal (United States 2013). Added research is needed to identify possible factors creating differences in combat leader to Private ratios, and whether Militia combat leader ratios are excessively low.

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